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Abstract
The reliability of traditional photogrammetric identification techniques using a small number of facial landmarks has recently come in for
criticism. However, the transformation of parameters into a new face space in which the error distributions are orthogonal, yields a maximum
likelihood solution to the problem of identifying a photographed face from a small, known, population which, in a simulated example, raises the
success rate from 20% to 93%. A full transformation yielding simultaneously independent population and error distributions can be derived from
raw population and error data using a straightforward computer procedure. Such a transformation facilitates computations for the situation where a
single suspect is held in custody and the likelihood ratio of his being identical with a photograph is desired. It seems premature to condemn
photogrammetry until the more efficient data-analysis approach outlined in this paper has been applied and tested.
# 2008 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
There have recently been some major advances in the
application of advanced statistical methods in forensic science,
such as the use of Bayesian Networks in quantitative and
qualitative situations [1,2] and the application of Bayesian
techniques to the analysis of manipulated evidence [3], to the
inference of identity in speaker recognition [4], and to the
analysis of fingerprint, face and signature evidence [5]. A novel
and complex score-normalization technique, KL-Tnorm, was
developed as an aid to automatic speaker recognition [6]. In
addition, a group at the University of Edinburgh led by
Professor Colin Aitken has carried out important and
pioneering work in the application of multivariate analysis to
the development of significance tests and likelihood ratios
(LRs) for the assessment of trace evidence, such as glass
fragments found at a crime scene and on a suspect [7].
This paper addresses one of this group of problems, namely
that of identifying faces from photographs, such as stills taken
from CCTV video footage. The traditional approach to this,
with historical roots in the work of the French pioneer of
anthropometry, Alphonse Bertillon, involves identifying a
number of well-defined points on the image, such as the left and
right ectocanthions, the stomion, and the nasion, and measuring
the distances between them. These measurements may be
standardized by dividing, for example, by the interpupillary
distance, to produce a number of proportion indices, or as they
are termed in Ref. [8], PIs; the angles between lines joining
pairs of landmarks can also be measured [8,9]. A more complex
technique involves principal component analysis of image
pixels, such as in Ref. [5], where a combination of eigenfaces
and fisherfaces involving 180 dimensions was used.
Both methods require an estimate of within-source
variability, i.e. the extent to which images from a particular
individual would tend to vary if the image were taken
repeatedly; without such an estimate, there can be no certainty
as to the range within which the true values of the parameters
for that individual may lie, and so the degree of confidence to be
placed in any identification is impossible to evaluate. Good
results were obtained in Ref. [5] from computing a minimum
variance estimate from the mean of all within-source
variabilities in the database.
Kleinberg et al. [8] adopted the converse strategy. They
conducted a series of tests in which they attempted to identify a
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video still of a subject by taking an individual PI measure from
that photo, and comparing it with the PI measurements for a set
of high-quality photos of 10 people including the subject, using
a closest fit criterion. They demonstrated that even the best
performing PI only identified the individual correctly in 25% of
cases, and concluded that the accuracy of the method was too
poor for use in the identification of criminals.
This paper examines the effectiveness of a multivariate
approach to the use of PIs in identification, in a situation
analogous to that in Ref. [8], and compares the results. It also
looks at the use of Bayesian methods for the case where there is
a single suspect and a photograph of a known perpetrator. This
approach differs from that in Ref. [7] in that we focus less on the
theoretical approach and more on providing practical details of
how to convert a set of raw photogrammetric data into
simultaneously orthogonalized population and error distribu-
tions with no assumptions of multivariate normality, using a
commonly available statistical program (SPSS). These methods
can be applied without too much effort to situations involving
many variables (we have trialled them with 16 variables)
whereas the methods examined in Ref. [7] were applied to only
three variables of interest. We do, moreover, make a significant
additional invariance assumption, spelt out in Section 2.2
below: the assumption seems plausible, but has not yet been
rigorously tested.
The Bayesian approach is sometimes taken to be synon-
ymous with the provision of likelihood ratios. In the words of
Ref. [5]: ‘‘the Bayesian approach provides . . . results in the
form of likelihood ratios (LR) from the forensic laboratory to
court’’. We conform with this approach to the extent that we
provide means of calculating LRs for face identification. The
approach has the advantage of being philosophically uncon-
troversial and mathematically precise. We also point out,
however, that it is at least theoretically possible to imagine
circumstances in which the bald provision of an LR without
qualification could be misleading. Our reason for confining
discussion to LRs and not attempting to apply Bayes’ theorem
to the calculation of posterior probabilities, is that this requires
an estimate of prior probability. This can be a highly
controversial area, and one in which agreement, especially
in an adversarial forensic context, is highly unlikely. Never-
theless, it seems worthwhile to point out that in the event that a
suspect is apprehended in the neighbourhood of a crime and
subsequently found to closely resemble a perpetrator, conclu-
sions as to his guilt are likely to be much better founded if his
apprehension was independent of the identification than if, for
example, his arrest followed a trawl of a digitized photographic
database to find the individual with best fit, even though the LRs
in these two hypothetical instances might be identical.
2. Methodology
2.1. Assumptions about the basic system
The situation envisaged here has three basic components. Firstly, there is an
agreed system of PIs based on facial landmarks, which can be measured by an
operator from a still photograph. (The term ‘‘PI’’ is used for convenience to
include any facial measurement, if necessary both distances and angles invol-
ving landmark points, which is the sense in which it is used in Ref. [8].)
Secondly, the assumption is made that there is a source of background data,
consisting of high-quality photographs of a large number of members of a
particular population, which can be measured accurately and their PIs deter-
mined (as might be the case for example if there is a national, digitized database
of passport photographs taken according to standard criteria). Thirdly, there will
be a system, such as a security camera, in a particular location, which is the
source of forensic data.
The first difficulty is to estimate the within-source variability of the camera
system. It is envisaged employing a purely empirical method for estimating
these errors, involving the calibration of a camera/operator system. This would
be complicated though not impracticable; it could involve for example testing
the system by repeatedly photographing volunteers having known PIs, using the
photogrammetric measurement system in question to obtain a scatterplot of
points within the multidimensional space represented by the PI measurements
as axes, and calculating the corresponding scatterplot of error vectors by
subtracting the known accurate PI parameters for the particular volunteer in
question, from those parameters estimated from the stills, to obtain an error
reading for that calibration point. The variance due to operator error could be
estimated (and reduced) if a number of operators were asked to measure the
same photo repeatedly. The errors will in practice depend on the distance from
the camera to the face, on the angle between the camera and the face and on
lighting levels. However, in many practical cases, where a camera is covering a
particular position (say the entrance to a building) from a particular angle and
where security lighting is installed, it is likely that these factors will have little
effect in comparison with other errors of measurement. The transformation
outlined below, which is the first step in our method, does not incidentally
depend on the calculation of parameters from this raw data; it can use the data in
their raw form.
It is assumed in what follows that the system is unbiassed, and that the error
distribution is the same for all faces in the population: photographing face ‘‘A’’
100 times, say, will yield the same distribution or scatterplot of PI measure-
ments around the mean values for face ‘‘A’’ as photographing face ‘‘B’’ round
the mean for face ‘‘B’’. A second, more immediately plausible assumption is
that the quality of PI data available in the population database is error-free in
comparisonwith the error introduced by the camera/operator system, and can be
ignored. This was not the assumption in Ref. [8], where all photos were of high
quality, and where the variance arose from the target photograph being taken on
a different occasion, and by a different camera, to the comparison photographs.
However, if target photographs are taken on different occasions and compared
with a fixed database of suspects, all the variance will be due to differences in
the target images, and the analysis in this paper can still be applied.
2.2. Preliminary analysis of the basic system
Even before dealing with the analysis of any ‘live’ data, considerable work
can be done on the population and error databases to enable the subsequent
analysis to proceed more easily. There are two sets of random variables (RVs) to
be considered. The first set is that of the values of the PIs for the faces in the
general population. Each face gives rise to a set of n parameters, or a vector in
the n-dimensional space with the PIs as the axes, and this vector can be
considered as itself being an RV, giving rise to a scatterplot in the PI-space.
Call this the population distribution in PI-space.
The second set of RVs consists of the errors in the PIs. This is also
represented by a series of vectors in the n-dimensional PI-space, and in this
case the scatterplot is, by assumption of zero bias, centred on the origin. Call this
the error distribution in PI-space. This is available from the process of error
calibration.
The assumption introduced above is that the error distribution is indepen-
dent of which face is being measured. Suppose v is a vector in the population
distribution corresponding to a particular face. Imagine that this face is now
measured repeatedly by the camera system in question. The distribution of face
vectors obtained will be the set of vectors {v + ei}, where e is a random variable
vector representing the error distribution. If w is another face vector, the set of
measurements that would be obtained from observing that face would of course
be {w + ei}. The key point is that even if the face vector changes, the
distribution of the set of points {ei} remains the same. In what follows, the
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vectors in the face space, both error vectors and face vectors, will be subjected to
a linear transformation; by virtue of linearity, it will leave invariant the property
just mentioned: if f is linear, it takes {v + ei} to {f(v) + f(ei)}, and likewise
{w + ei} to {f(w) + f(ei)}, so that the property of the invariance of the error term
is preserved in the transformed space.
In general, there will be non-zero product–moment correlations between
pairs of PI variables, for both the population and error distributions. The use of
Bayes’ theorem requires the calculation of the probability density functions
(pdfs) for both distributions. These are much simpler to calculate if the PI-space
has first been transformed, by choosing new axes such that for both distribu-
tions, variation along these new axes is independent. This can be achieved by
appealing to the well-known theorem of linear algebra which states that for a
pair of real, symmetric matrices, one of which is positive definite, it is possible
to choose a coordinate system in which both are simultaneously diagonalized,
with the positive definite matrix assuming the form of the identity (see for
example Ref. [10], p. 58). In the present instance, the covariance matrices of
both the distributions are positive definite, so either could be chosen as the
identity, but there are advantages in choosing the error distribution for this.
Appendix A provides details of how the transformation to simultaneous
principal axes can be carried out for real data, using a widely available statistical
package, SPSS. The consequent matrix multiplications are simple enough to be
executed using the basic functions and formula-dragging facilities in a program
like Excel. An example of this method applied to a sample dataset is given in
Appendix B. It is assumed in what follows that this transformation has been
carried out, so that the PE covariance matrix is the identity, and the population
distribution matrix is diagonalized.
I make the final assumption that the distribution of all individual variables is
Gaussian multivariate normal. Failure of normality would not be fatal to the
method: as demonstrated for example in Ref. [7], it is possible in the event of
failure of normality to use a kernel density estimate to approximate the actual
distribution found. In the analysis of an initial data set involving 16 photo-
grammetric variables within a limited experimental population of 100 indivi-
duals and a single camera, we found that once the population and error
distributions had been simultaneously diagonalized, all 32 variables were
normal using the univariate Kolmogorov–Smirnov statistic ( p  .05, Bonfer-
roni correction). Univariate tests are of course sufficient to determine multi-
variate normality at this stage, all variables being orthogonal. We might also
expect on general principles that the linear transformations involved in diag-
onalization would tend to produce new variables likely to approximate normal-
ity more closely than the original ones, if only because the central limit theorem
would suggest that linear combinations of many random variables are likely to
approach normality. However, failure of normality would not condemn the
method. We make the assumption of normality here if only because it enables
mathematically exact solutions to be described more easily, and shortens the
discussion. However, the simultaneous orthogonalization procedure works in
SPSS without any assumptions of normality, and this procedure is used here, to
our knowledge, for the first time in this application.
2.3. Nature of the problem: challenges in identification
As remarked in Ref. [8], it is important to be clear about the objectives when
a surveillance system is established. It is assumed that its main purpose is that,
in the event that a crime is committed, the person responsible (the ‘perpetrator’)
is caught on camera. Suppose that independently, a ‘suspect’ is arrested in the
vicinity by police, perhaps investigating an alarm or report of crime in the area.
The arrest might be on grounds of suspicious behaviour and possession of items
or equipment suggesting criminal intent. The suspect is then taken to the police
station and photographed to establish their PIs accurately. The forensic expert is
asked to provide evidence on whether or not the suspect is identical with the
perpetrator. Alternatively, the expert may be provided with the crime scene
photograph and a database of criminal suspects, and asked to rule on which if
any of them might be identical with the perpetrator caught on camera.
We wish by examination of the photographs of the perpetrator and the
suspect to determine whether the corresponding individuals (i.e. the suspect and
the perpetrator) are identical. In this first case, where a suspect has already been
arrested, there are two mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses to be
considered: H, that the suspect is the perpetrator, and A, that he is not. If A is
true, it is assumed that the suspect is a random sample from the population on
which the population distribution is based. The strict Bayesian approach
requires the estimation of a prior probability for H, before the video evidence
is taken into account, in accordance with the formula:
PrðHjvÞ ¼ PrðHÞ  PrðvjHÞfPrðHÞ  PrðvjHÞ þ PrðAÞ  PrðvjAÞg :
Here the symbol ‘Pr’ refers either to finite probabilities or to pdfs; the context
makes it obvious which is intended.
In some treatments (e.g. Ref. [5]) the formula
PrðHjvÞ ¼ PrðHÞ  PrðvjHÞfPrðHÞ  PrðvjHÞ þ PrðAÞ  PrðvjAÞg
is rewritten in terms of the odds and the likelihood ratio, defined as Pr(vjH)/
Pr(vjA), as follows:
OðHjvÞ ¼ OðHÞ  LR;where the odds of an event E areOðEÞ ¼ PrðEÞð1 PrðEÞÞ
Pr(vjH) is simply the pdf of v on condition that the suspect is the perpetrator,
i.e. it is given by the error distribution centred on the suspect’s parameters,
which we will call vectorw say. It is the probability of measuring v in the photo,
conditional on the true value of the PI vector for the suspect being w. It can be
calculated from the Euclidean distance between v and w in the transformed PI-
space, because the Mahalanobis distance giving the multinomial normal error
distribution is equal to the Euclidean distance: all error variances are unity, and
independent. Pr(vjA) is the distribution of v on the assumption that it is from an
unknown member of the population, and not the suspect. But this is practically
equivalent to stating that v is measured from a random member of the
population, so Pr(vjA) = Pr(v) in the absence of any other information.
There is one final twist in the calculation of Pr(v). The distribution of v in PI-
space is not exactly that of the set of transformed faces, i.e. the population
distribution in this space. This is because v represents the PIs taken from a
random member of the population using the noisy camera system. The dis-
tribution of v therefore comprises two elements: the variance of the population,
and the variance introduced by the video system itself. It is therefore the sum of
two RVs, one from the population distribution, and one from the error terms.
This means that if the standard deviations (S.D.s) of the population distribution
along the transformed axes are {si} for i = 1, . . ., n, the distribution of v is
similar but with S.D.s of si ¼ fðs2i þ 1Þ1=2g for i = 1, . . ., n, along the axes. This
gives all the information now required to compute the posterior likelihood that
the suspect is the perpetrator.
The LR has been recommended as a means of presenting forensic evidence
in an understandable manner [5,11–13]. Indeed, most treatments of forensic
applications of the Bayesian approach prefer to avoid the controversial area of
prior probabilities, i.e. the estimation of O(H) in order to give O(Hjv) by
multiplication. It seems to be assumed that the calculation of LRs is sufficient to
encapsulate the effective message of forensic analysis, while at the same time
steering clear of any awkward controversy.
Unfortunately, however, there may be circumstances in which at least a very
rough estimate of O(H) may be unavoidable. Suppose for example the suspect
has been identified not on the basis of independent evidence but because the
investigating authorities have trawled a database of digitized photographs and
found him to be the best fit, and found, say, an LR of 10,000 on this basis. Mere
common sense would suggest that such an identification is much less secure
than if an individual had been arrested at the scene of a crime that had occurred
shortly before, and at a place and time when there were few if any other likely
suspects, and only subsequently been found to fit the photograph of the
perpetrator, with an LR of 10,000. Common sense, often a misleading guide,
can here be given a theoretical justification. We should observe that when the
suspect has been identified only after examination of the PI database, and
therefore there was no prior information against him, O(H) should be equated
with 1/(N  1) where N is the size of the digitized database. Whereas when the
suspect was arrested on account of other suspicious circumstances, the prior
probability might be estimated (admittedly very roughly) at not less than 0.01:
imagine a deserted industrial estate at 3 a.m. where the suspect has been picked
up acting suspiciously. This suggests that even a very crude estimation of priors
may give important information on how to interpret LRs which we ignore at
peril of miscarriages of justice.
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It may be urged as an objection to the first scenario that such a trawl is at
present beyond the resources of any law enforcement agency. One might
respond that passport photographs are already digitized in some countries,
and technical developments may well make it possible to measure PIs auto-
matically within, say, the next 15 years if not sooner. At any event, if LRs are
employed exclusively, it is worth pointing out the need to use them with care
and discretion.
In what follows we focus on the LR, for which exact estimates can be made
that evade the troublesome philosophical controversies, with the caveat that
evasion of this problem does not necessarily equate to its avoidance.
Assuming as above that Pr(vjA) = Pr(v), the expression for the LR can be
expanded as follows, using well-known expressions for the pdfs of independent
multivariate normal distributions:
LR ¼ expðd
2=2Þ PiðsiÞ
expðD2=2Þ ¼ exp
ðD2  d2Þ
2
 
PiðsiÞ
where d is the Mahalanobis (or Euclidean) distance of the suspect face from the
perpetrator in the error distribution, D is the Mahalanobis distance of the
perpetrator from the centroid of the distribution in the face distribution (with
S.D.s si as above) and the product term is to adjust the pdf for the non-unity
S.D.s in the face distribution. Ignoring the term in D for the moment (and it will
differ little from 1 if the target face is near the average, i.e. the centroid of the
population distribution), the LR is seen to depend not only on the distance of the
faces in error space, but also on the product of the S.D.s of the face/picture
distribution. This product is a good measure of the sensitivity of the system, and
could be used to compare different camera/operator systems.
3. Results
3.1. Identification of a suspect already detained
In the case of the system considered in Appendix B, the
product term is 19.51989 and assuming for simplicity that
D = 0, the maximum value of the LR is just under 20, when
d = 0. This is unlikely to be of much use for securing a
conviction, however close the perpetrator face is to the
suspect’s face. The system is simply not sensitive enough to
give proof of identity beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the minimum value of the LR is of course bounded
below only by zero, so in this case clear evidence of non-
identity is possible. Acting for the defendant, we may consider
an LR of 1/1000 as sufficient to cast grave doubt on the
suspect’s guilt: even with a prior likelihood of guilt of 99.9%,
an LR of this value will reduce the posterior probability of guilt
to just 50%.
What is the minimum value of d for which LR < .001? This
gives (assuming again D = 0) exp(d2/2) < .001/19.52, and
d2 = 2ln(19520) = 19.76, and finally d = 4.45. So even if proof
of guilt is unlikely to be obtained by using this system, in many
cases proof of innocence could be demonstrated.
If the case where D is large is now considered, a heuristic
argument can be used to show that even an insensitive system
may give a high LR when d is sufficiently small and D
sufficiently large. To take an extreme example, suppose a
perpetrator has so untypical a set of PIs, and lies so far from the
centroid of the population distribution, and in such a sparsely
populated portion of it, that a sphere of radius d = 4.45 around
the target contains no other individual from the entire
population. Suppose for simplicity also that the suspect
happens to have identical measurements to the perpetrator’s
image. Then it seems clear that the suspect must be the
perpetrator. For any other individual than the suspect must lie
outside the critical region of radius 4.45, and therefore be ruled
innocent by the argument given above.
The critical value of D to ensure a high LR can be calculated
for the simulated system. If we demand an LR of at least
10,000, we require that
exp
ðD2  d2Þ
2
 
PiðsiÞ> 10; 000;
and soðassuming themost favourable case; d ¼ 0Þ
exp(D2/2) > 10,000/19.52, and finally D > 3.54. Examination
of the chi-square distribution with 3 d.f. with chi-square = (D2)
shows that this will happen in approximately 0.5% of cases
(one-tailed p = .005); the method will thus be sufficiently
sensitive in this, admittedly very small, proportion of cases.
3.2. Identification from face data alone
A situation that may occur increasingly often is that where
there is no suspect in custody, and it is necessary to attempt to
identify an individual from a photograph alone. If the
transformed parameters for the faces whose data are given in
Appendix B are jittered by the transformed values of the errors,
and then compared with the originals and the ‘best fit’ found in
terms of the Euclidean distance in image space, the correct
identification is made in all but four cases. The total number of
trials was 60, with each face given 6 error ‘jitters’ and then
tested against the 10 exact values. Face 1 was misidentified as
face 2, face 4 as face 6, face 6 as face 4 and face 10 as face 8, in
each case for just one value of the error jitter. That meant that 56
out of 60 trials, or 93%, produced correct identifications.
When the method in Ref. [8] was used, each untransformed
PI was tested in turn. The method was given the benefit of the
doubt when it identified two faces, one of which was correct, as
equally close to the probe. The most successful PI was PI2,
which gave a success rate of 12 out of 60 trials or 20%. PI1 and
PI3 had successes on just 6 trials each, or 10%. These figures
are comparable with those in Ref. [8].
It might be thought that if individual PIs are unsatisfactory,
then taking all three PIs simultaneously and judging closest fit
by Euclidean distance in the untransformed face space, might
give all the benefits of using the transformed space, without the
tedious matrix manipulations. This method was in fact tested on
the simulated faces. Out of 60 trials (each face presented six
times, i.e. jittered by the six error terms) 40 successfully
identified the correct face, or 42 if dead heats were given the
benefit of the doubt. This represents a success rate of just 70%.
Admittedly it did give much better results than for using
individual PIs to judge identity, but the outcome was still much
inferior to working in the transformed space.
By comparison, taking a single PI formed by adding the
three original parameters and taking as the identification
criterion Euclidean distance with respect to this single
dimension, 46 faces were correctly identified out of 60 trials,
giving a 77% success rate. (For an explanation of why this
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parameter outperformed both the individual PIs and the use of a
Euclidean distance criterion in the untransformed PI-space, see
Section 4.)
4. Discussion
4.1. Sensitivity of simulated example
The PCA-based analysis of the simulated example seems
almost unreasonably powerful in view of the fact that only three
PIs were used. The reason for its success in this case can be seen
by looking at the transformation matrix,
10:07838 5:941495 0:778506
16:249 2:14996 3:36617
11:17439 3:153 2:844475
The striking thing about it is that the first column is evidently
larger than the other two. Very approximately, it is a multiple of
the matrix with 1’s down the first column and zeros elsewhere.
The S.D.s of the new variables are:
10:86191 1:571878 1:143279
and these confirm that the first component seems to be the most
effective in producing variance that is large compared with the
error variance (which is unity along each axis). In fact, little
would be lost by taking this first component alone and dis-
carding the rest. But this component is approximately a multi-
ple of (PI1 + PI2 + PI3). The reason for the effectiveness of
doing this is seen if this simple transformation is applied to the
PIs and the error terms (see Appendix B). The variance between
the faces for the three original PIs and this new one are:
0:302765 0:31693 0:313404 0:856673
whereas for the error terms, the variances are:
0:130384 0:148324 0:186548 0:107703
where the first three terms refer to the old PIs and the final one
to their sum. The variance has increased for the face population,
but decreased for the corresponding error term. The ratios
between the two, which determine the sensitivity of the system,
have increased from
2:322102 2:13674 1:680023
to
7:954011
and this shows that even with this crude approximation, it is
possible to find a new PI which is much more effective than any
of the original ones taken individually, with a success rate of
77% compared with 70% with the use of all three PIs in
untransformed space, and 10–20% for the individual PIs.
It is possible that with a small number of variables and data,
a suitable combined PI could be found by inspection. But the
merit of the PCA approach adopted here is that it automatically
discovers the combinations of PIs which yield the best results
and gives them full credit in the analysis. There are other
benefits. To quote from Ref. [8]: ‘‘one important factor that may
limit the reliability of anthropometric proportions is changes in
facial expression’’. However, if the system is error-calibrated
using volunteers who are instructed to assume a variety of
expressions, the method will automatically take this into
account and find linear combinations of face measurements
which separate out the sources of error into independent
components. It is likely that PIs will exhibit a degree of
correlation when different expressions are assumed, particu-
larly if there are, say, 10 or more PIs; most expressions will be
accounted for by changes in a small number of these. The
effects will be limited by the fact that facial muscles tend to
reflect the basic emotions of happiness, sadness, anger, fear,
surprise, disgust [14]. It has been argued by Schlosberg and his
successors that there are perhaps only two underlying
dimensions of variation [15,16], in which case an analysis
involving 10 PIs may ‘use up’ two of them in accounting for
spurious variance due to changes in expression, still leaving
ample scope in the remaining variables to track genuine
individual differences in facial characteristics.
4.2. Application to identification of an unknown suspect
On the question of identifying a perpetrator from a
database of possible suspects, the comparison between using
Euclidean distance in transformed space and the comparison
of raw PI data as in Ref. [8], shows that the latter method is
indeed as faulty as the authors suggest, but it also shows that
even in this very simple example with just three parameter
variables, use of the transform raises the success rate from a
dismal 10–20% to a respectable 93%. In practice, anthro-
pometry would almost certainly use more than three
parameters, and one could expect the superiority of this
method over that based on individual PIs to increase
monotonically, if not proportionally, with the number of
variables considered. Moreover, as mentioned in Ref. [8],
other data such as comparison of eye and eyebrow shapes or
mouth and nose sizes may distinguish individuals with near or
identical PI measurements. With a method that is no more
than 20% accurate this would be of little value, but the
simulated data gave complete accuracy in 93% of cases, and
even where the closest face was incorrect, the correct face was
second closest. A procedure which involved checking both
first and second choices for secondary characteristics such as
eyebrow shape or mouth size would plausibly improve the
success rate for the present system to something close to
100%.
Note that identifying a face on the basis of closest fit in the
transformed space can be seen as an approximation to a
Bayesian decision procedure, at least in the multivariate normal
case. To show this, assume that the perpetrator must be one of a
set of N suspect faces, each suspect having equal prior
probability of being the perpetrator. If we write Hi for the
hypothesis ‘‘suspect i is the perpetrator’’ and Ai for the logically
contrary alternative hypothesis ‘‘suspect j is the perpetrator for
some j 6¼ i’’, then Bayes’ theorem states that
OðHijvÞ ¼ OðHiÞ  LRi;
where LRi ¼ PrðvjHiÞ=PrðvjAiÞ:
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We now make the plausible approximation that all the
denominators in the expressions for LRi are equal as i varies.
That is, we assume that if we remove one individual from the
list of suspects and calculate the value of the probability
function (assuming the known error distribution) at the actual
obtained perpetrator face v, this value will not vary significantly
whichever face we decide to remove. This assumption can of
course be tested if necessary in particular cases.
Making this assumption, we conclude that
OðHijvÞ ¼ l PrðvjHiÞ;
where l is a constant that is independent of i.
If we now adopt the Bayesian decision procedure ‘‘identify
that individual i as the perpetrator for which the posterior
probability of i’s guilt is the maximum out of the list of
suspects’’, this procedure amounts to maximising Pr(vjHi).
But in our face space, in which the variables have been
chosen so that the errors are independent standard normal
distributions, Pr(vjHi) has a distribution whose value is a
monotonically decreasing function of the Mahalanobis distance
between v and vi, the face vector for suspect i. Therefore,
finally, we have shown that our Bayesian decision procedure
amounts to choosing that suspect whose face is closest, using
the error-based Mahalanobis distance, to the perpetrator’s
image.
Therefore there are not two distinct methods, but really only
one. The maximum likelihood method is an approximation to
the full method, and will yield a useful result only in cases
where it is known that the perpetrator comes from a given pool
of suspects, and where there is no reason to favour any suspect
over any other. Even then, it is a somewhat crude instrument, in
that like any ‘‘first past the post’’ system, it may not lead to a fair
result. It has the advantage of simplicity, however, in that
because it does not require the explicit calculation of Pr(vjAi),
or indeed of Pr(v), it does not necessitate the double PCA that is
needed if the actual value of the LR is needed for any particular
suspect. In other words, the simplification arises because only
relative, not absolute values of LR suffice for this particular
procedure.
We did not therefore really test the full method when, above,
we showed that the transformed variables gave greater ability to
identify faces than either the use of univariate PIs or a simple
Euclidean distance based on untransformed variables. This cut
down version of the method could in fact have been carried out
using a simple one-stage transformation to independent
standardized error variables. The full two-stage method would
only show its value in cases where it is necessary to calculate
the LR for a suspect, rather than simply to compare his LR with
that of other suspects. Where the full LR is needed, our method
provides a valid method of calculating it, which is why we have
demonstrated all the steps needed to do this, in Appendices A
and B.
5. Conclusions
The use of a double PCA transformation enables an exact
solution to be found to statistical questions involving face data
with a limited number of parameters. In particular, the method
allows the calculation of LRs when comparing a photograph
with a known suspect, and automatically gives the maximum
likelihood solution, equivalent to a comparison of LRs, when an
identification is to be made from a pool of suspects. It appears
significantly more effective than either identification using an
individual parameter, or the use of pooled parameters in an
untransformed face space. The relative simplicity of the
method, compared with sophisticated modern techniques such
as eigenfaces, may recommend it when explaining the outcome
of a photogrammetric analysis in a courtroom setting.
It would be premature to conclude, as some authors have
done, that identification using facial landmarks is inefficient,
until the most powerful methods of analysis have been tried and
found wanting. This paper suggests theoretical approaches
which maximize the value of photogrammetric information. A
fair assessment of photogrammetry will only be possible once
these methods have been applied in a practical context and the
results evaluated; we should not lightly discard the methods
introduced by Bertillon, and which were historically so
important in law enforcement.
If evaluation of these exact analytical methods proves to be
positive, then their applications should be of value not only in
providing evidence for identity, but also in alerting law
enforcement agencies to the dangers of unsafe identifications
when they rely on camera/operator systems which are
intrinsically unreliable.
International cooperation between law enforcement agen-
cies and the exchange of intelligence on criminals and their
activities is currently more necessary than ever [17,18].
Mathematically optimal methods of analysis in face identifica-
tion might assist the standardization of methodology, thereby
facilitating these highly desirable developments.
Appendix A
The first step is to standardize the error distribution. Suppose
there are n PI measurements (variables v1; . . . ; vn), and
therefore also n PI error terms, e1, . . ., en. Suppose the S.D.s of
the error terms are e1, . . ., en, respectively. Multiply each error
variable by the inverse of the appropriate S.D., so the new,
rescaled error variables are e1/e1, . . ., en/en; they will therefore
be standardized (zero mean, unit variance). (This is needed
because in SPSS, PCA using the correlation matrix auto-
matically standardizes the variables before operating on them,
and we need to ensure that this concealed transformation is
made explicit so that it can be performed also on the population
distribution variables.) Apply the same multiplication by e1i
also to each of the population distribution variables vi.
Now apply a principal component analysis to the
transformed set of error terms. In SPSS, go to ANALY-
ZE DATA REDUCTION FACTOR ANALYSIS.
Enter all rescaled error variables into the ‘variables’ box.
Ensure the following settings are used:
Rotation – Method – none.
Scores – check ‘Display factor score coefficient matrix’.
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Extraction – Method – Principal Components [not any other
factor analysis method].
Analyze – correlation matrix.
Display – unrotated factor solution.
Extract – number of factors – enter total number n of
variables.
The output gives the Component Score Coefficient Matrix.
Extract this, for example to EXCEL or MATLAB, and apply it
(by post-multiplication) to transform both the error distribution
and the population distribution, to give a new error distribution
and population distribution, in which the new variables are the
components taken from the PCA. Because the error distribution
variables were used in the PCA, the new error distribution will
consist of independent components, each of unit variance. The
new components of the population distribution will not, in
general, be independent.
The final step is to transform to a second set of components,
in which the population distribution axes will also be
independent. To do this, go to
ANALYZEDATAREDUCTION FACTORANALYSIS:
Enter all population distribution components derived from
the first PCA into the ‘variables’ box.
Ensure the following settings are used:
Rotation – Method – none.
Extraction – Method – Principal Components.
Analyze – covariance matrix [note, this is essential: using
the correlation matrix, which is the default setting in
SPSS, standardizes the variables prior to analysis and
makes the error axes no longer of unit variance].
Extract – number of factors – enter total number n of
variables.
The output will display the Component Matrix, sub-
divided into raw and rescaled versions. Copy the raw version
into e.g. Excel. Before applying it to the variables, divide
each column of the matrix by its ‘length’ (square root of
inner product with itself). This ensures that the matrix is
orthogonal. It is known that such a transformation will
preserve the property of the error distribution variables, that
they are statistically independent and of unit variance. At the
same time, the matrix still, after, normalization, transforms
the population distribution variables into independent
components. We have therefore achieved the desired
transformation.
Appendix B
The artificial set of data involves just three PIs, ten faces,
and six error measurements. The situation is clearly
unrealistic, but may serve as an indication of how much more
powerful the Bayesian approach can be even for very sparse
information sets than relying on individual PIs to discriminate
faces.
The data are as follows. Face parameter measurements:
PI1 PI2 PI3
Face 1 1.5 1.3 1.6
Face 2 1.3 1.4 1.4
Face 3 1.6 1.6 1.8
Face 4 1.7 2 1.9
Face 5 1.4 1.2 1.1
Face 6 1.8 2 2
Face 7 1.2 1.5 1.2
Face 8 1.9 1.8 1.7
Face 9 1.1 1.1 1.2
Face 10 2 1.7 1.5
Error terms:
PI1 PI2 PI3
0.1 0.15 0.11
0.15 0.1 0.11
0.1 0.15 0.24
0.15 0.15 0.11
0.1 0.1 0.15
0.1 0.15 0.24
Note that for each PI the error variables have, as required, a
mean of zero.
Carrying out the three steps in the recipe given above results
in the following successive operations, where all matrix
multiplications are post-multiplications, and all vectors are
row vectors (e.g. the vector representing face 1 is (1.5, 1.3,
1.6)):
1. Multiply by the diagonal matrix with entries
7:66965 6:741999 5:360563
representing the inverse of the error S.D.s.
2. Multiply by the component score coefficient matrix
represented by the new error terms, which is found from
SPSS to be:
1 2 3
PI1 error 0:24 0:861 1:24
PI2 error 0:518 0:019 2:427
PI3 error 0:451 0:48 2:131
3. Obtain the raw component matrix for the new face
variables:
1 2 3
FCP1 0:114 0:197 0:547
FCP2 0:961 1:192 0:09
FCP3 10:772 0:108 0:002
and divide the columns by their ‘lengths’ to obtain the
following orthogonal matrix:
0:010541 0:162409021 0:986727
0:088855 0:982698238 0:16235
0:995989 0:089036418 0:003608
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which, post-multiplying both the error and the face parameters,
gives, finally,
err1 0:20033 0:569813 0:895668
err2 1:342326 1:45305 0:1405
err3 1:25234 0:15992 1:26545
err4 0:30359 0:866888 0:934594
err5 0:95658 0:8521 0:685438
err6 0:763335 1:028377 1:10975
and
face 1 54:1203 1:072489 1:342897
face 2 51:49464 0:299795 0:281684
face 3 62:23772 0:39105 0:979792
face 4 70:86259 0:19009 0:00438
face 5 45:90036 2:269837 0:179427
face 6 72:98787 0:088764 0:35792
face 7 49:87683 0:12125 0:70168
face 8 67:39359 2:058807 0:255662
face 9 42:36939 0:387084 0:566939
face 10 64:54165 3:498553 0:101235
It can be verified that the error terms are independent and of
unit variance and that the face terms are also independent,
though not of course of unit variance. The manipulations are
complete, except to calculate the S.D.s of the new face
distribution, which are
10:81578 1:212766 0:554155
The S.D.s of the population of photos of faces now has the
S.D.s
10:86191 1:571878 1:143279
taking into account the fact that the act of deriving a photo from
a face adds an independent random variable of unit variance to
it, i.e. the S.D.s {si} for i = 1, . . ., n, must be corrected to
fðs2i þ 1Þ1=2g to represent the distribution of the photos, as
required for Bayes’ formula.
The three steps given above can of course be combined into a
single post-multiplication by the product of the three matrices,
namely
10:07838 5:941495 0:778506
16:249 2:14996 3:36617
11:17439 3:153 2:844475
and it can be checked that applying this to the original set of
data gives the final set directly. Moreover, using this matrix
enables any target or probe face in the original set of variables
to be transformed into the new variables and conclusions to be
drawn using Bayes’ theorem.
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